Daniel Saavedra

Assistant Professor of Accounting


Daniel Saavedra’s research on financial contracting explores how to design different types of contracts so that the incentives of all parties involved are properly aligned. He also studies the economic consequences to U.S. firms that engage in tax avoidance activities and examines whether lenders charge higher interest rates to borrowers that have made unusually large payments to tax authorities before contract initiation.

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4 Articles

The old Continental Illinois building in Chicago Research Brief / Finance

Sorting Out Conflicts of Interest in Commercial Loan Syndicates

Syndicate voting rules reflect varying levels of trust and familiarity

Manila file folders with U.S. government form 8-K on top Research Brief / Corporate Finance

Corporate Borrowing on the Down Low

18% of firms fail to promptly disclose new loan deals

Blurry image of a document that has redaction Research Brief / Banking

When Lenders Put a Muzzle on Borrowers

Companies hide from shareholders information about loans — more than likely to appease banks

Illustration of a tower taller than city buildings Research Brief / Corporate Finance

Forgoing a Tax Refund to Signal Brightening Financial Prospects

Companies that use loss carry-forwards to offset future tax liability, instead of claiming a refund, enjoy favorable lending terms