Beatrice Michaeli
Associate Professor of Accounting
About
Beatrice Michaeli’s research uses Bayesian persuasion models to study firms’ information gathering and dissemination choices. One project considers the investment distortions caused by suboptimal information gathering. Michaeli is also applying a principal-agent framework to explore the link between relationship-specific investments of business units involved in joint projects and compensation risk. The results shed light on the investment distortions and their mitigation through optimally adjusted compensation schemes. She is interested in studying optimal investment authority allocation and the ability of divisional managers engaged in joint projects to collude against the principal and earn “arbitrage” profits.
Topics
5 Articles
The Role of Board-of-Directors Pay in Effective Corporate Investing
A model juggles who should suffer when a project goes awry; job market prospects of the CEO; and the quality of information shared in the boardroom
What Investors Infer From External News And Management Silence
Uncertainty about outside news alters company disclosures and how markets interpret them, study finds
How to Properly Incentivize Your Unicorn Finder
VCs and other investors need a contract with their seeker that blunts conflicts of interest
A Skeptical Board Can Protect Shareholders From an Empire-Building CEO
Director expertise disciplines CEO into providing better information
Do Fair Disclosure Rules Lead to More or Less Information?
Managers, forced to inform a broader audience, choose not to gather information even for themselves