Associate Professor of Accounting
Beatrice Michaeli’s research uses Bayesian persuasion models to study firms’ information gathering and dissemination choices. One project considers the investment distortions caused by suboptimal information gathering. Michaeli is also applying a principal-agent framework to explore the link between relationship-specific investments of business units involved in joint projects and compensation risk. The results shed light on the investment distortions and their mitigation through optimally adjusted compensation schemes. She is interested in studying optimal investment authority allocation and the ability of divisional managers engaged in joint projects to collude against the principal and earn “arbitrage” profits.
How to Properly Incentivize Your Unicorn Finder
VCs and other investors need a contract with their seeker that blunts conflicts of interest
A Skeptical Board Can Protect Shareholders From an Empire-Building CEO
Director expertise disciplines CEO into providing better information
Do Fair Disclosure Rules Lead to More or Less Information?
Managers, forced to inform a broader audience, choose not to gather information even for themselves