Beatrice Michaeli

Assistant Professor of Accounting

About

Beatrice Michaeli’s research uses Bayesian persuasion models to study firms’ information gathering and dissemination choices. One project considers the investment distortions caused by suboptimal information gathering. Michaeli is also applying a principal-agent framework to explore the link between relationship-specific investments of business units involved in joint projects and compensation risk. The results shed light on the investment distortions and their mitigation through optimally adjusted compensation schemes. She is interested in studying optimal investment authority allocation and the ability of divisional managers engaged in joint projects to collude against the principal and earn “arbitrage” profits.

Read Full Bio 
Topics
Photo of Beatrice Michaeli

2 Articles

Research Brief / Corporate Investment

A Skeptical Board Can Protect Shareholders From an Empire-Building CEO

Director expertise disciplines CEO into providing better information

Illustration of two men talking Research Brief / Investing

Do Fair Disclosure Rules Lead to More or Less Information?

Managers, forced to inform a broader audience, choose not to gather information even for themselves